However, concept learning improved with each set-size expansion, and the jays reached full concept learning with a 128-image set. This performance is similar to the other corvids and monkeys tested, all of which outperform pigeons. Results from the current study show a qualitative similarity in full abstract-concept learning in all species tested with a quantitative difference in the set-size functions, highlighting the shared survival importance of mechanisms supporting abstract-concept learning for corvids and primates. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).When an eyewitness makes an identification from a lineup, police are also instructed to collect a verbal expression of confidence. PLX4032 This recommendation hinges on the assumption that evaluators will perceive confidence in the manner the witness intended. However, research has consistently shown that these interpretations can be biased by accompanying contextual information. For example, statements that reference facial features (e.g., “I’m very sure. I remember his eyes.”) are perceived as less confident than when the statement is presented alone (“I’m very sure.”) (featural justification effect). Additionally, perceptions of witness confidence are altered when the witness’s identification (mis-)matches the police suspect in a lineup (prior knowledge). We find that the same underlying mechanism explains the bias induced by both featural justification (Experiments 1 and 2) and prior knowledge (Experiment 3) manipulations. Evaluators conflate their own beliefs about the accuracy of an identification with the witness’s intended level of confidence. A simple warning that highlights the differences between confidence and accuracy eliminates the featural justification effect, but is less effective for mitigating the influence of prior knowledge. The key takeaway from this paper is that distinguishing perceptions of certainty from those of accuracy improves the interpretation of verbal confidence statements. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).Reassigning responsibility is the most prominent and best-replicated intervention against escalating commitment (i.e., the failure to withdraw from losing courses of action). This intervention is considered effective because it reduces reinvestments after negative feedback in decision scenarios with a single reinvestment decision. However, we argue that any intervention against escalating commitment should fulfill two additional criteria. The first is temporal stability, that is, the beneficial effects of the intervention need to persist beyond a single reinvestment decision. The second is specific effectiveness, that is, the intervention should reduce commitment only if the project continues to fail after an initial setback (structural failure) but not if it recovers and is ultimately profitable (temporary failure). To subject reassignment of responsibility to this critical test of effectiveness, we introduce a modification of the escalation paradigm that allows testing for temporal stability and differentiates between structural and temporary failure. In the first of two experiments, we did not find evidence of temporal stability. Experiment 2 found persistent short-term effects of responsibility reassignment, but these effects were unspecific, reducing commitment to both losing and ultimately successful courses of action. Our findings question the usefulness of responsibility reassignment as an effective intervention against escalating commitment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).While previous research has revealed several reasons why humans generally do good deeds, we explore a simple nudge that might get more of them done the “maybe favor.” We first show conceptually that, compared to a conventional favor, humans are more willing to grant a favor to a stranger on which they might eventually not have to make good. Furthermore, we conducted a series of fully incentivized experiments (total N = 3,475) where participants could make actual donations to charity. Introducing a “maybe” into our donation proposals by randomly revoking some donations not only led to significant increases in donation rates but also increased the total amount of donations. That is, due to biased perceptions of costs and benefits combined with nonlinear probability weighting, the donations we revoked due to the “maybe” were overcompensated by an increased overall willingness-to-donate. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).Prior research has demonstrated that angry participants exhibit biased threat detection whereby they are more likely to misidentify neutral objects as guns. Yet, it is unclear whether independent components of anger, such as conceptual knowledge about anger or the affective features of an anger instance, could lead to altered bias alone. Consistent with constructionist theories of emotion, the present set of two experiments demonstrates that threat-detection bias only differs significantly between participants in an emergent-anger condition, who had engaged both components of anger (i.e., conceptual knowledge of anger and negative, high arousal affect), and participants in a control condition, who had engaged neither. Study 2 demonstrates that this pattern of findings also extends to another threat-relevant emotional state (i.e., fear). Implications for studying anger and fear, and emotions more generally, as constructed mental experiences are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).Previous research has demonstrated that some pairs of emotion expressions are confusing to observers because they share common facial-muscular expressive features. Recent research has suggested that another expressive feature, facial coloration, can facilitate the disambiguation of these emotion expressions. The current work tests this hypothesis by presenting participants with pairs of ambiguous emotion expressions with varying facial coloration, then assessing perceived emotion via continuous ratings and categorizations. The results demonstrated that facial coloration can influence perceived emotion within the emotion pairs of anger-disgust (Experiment 1), surprise-fear (Experiments 2a and 2b), and tearful sadness-happiness (Experiment 3). Further, this influence contributed to emotion disambiguation nonuniformly between emotion pairs. Implications discussed include the role of facial coloration in emotion perception, conceptualizations of emotion categories, and the use of posed facial expression stimuli in emotion research.